Thursday, June 9, 2016

INDIA INDONESIAN RICE DEAL---NOT LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL-FINANCIAL EXPRESS 9.06.2016







  


WILL “G TO G” RICE DEAL WITH INDONESIA SUCCEED?

There is wide spread reporting of upcoming Government to Government (G to G) export deal of one million tons of non-basmati rice from India to Indonesia from the stocks of FCI through one of the PSUs—may be STC or MMTC. The counter party or the buyer is Indonesia's state-run logistics agency “BULOG” which undertakes annual import of 1.5 to 2 million tons of rice for meeting any supply demand mismatch and domestic price stabilization. Barring a few exceptions, most of imported rice for Indonesia is bought from Thailand and Vietnam.
Indonesia/BULOG purchased the following “non –basmati rice” in the past from Indian private exporters.
Year
Indonesian Buyer
Indian Sellers
Qty.Metric tons
Price C&F in $/mt
Broken % of white  rice
Nov-11
Bulog
Private Trade
250000
483
10
Dec-12
Bulog
Private Trade
120000
437
15

The experience of the private trade in dealing with rigid and inflexible terms of BULOG was very challenging and almost all traders either suffered loss of profit or outright loss after the implementation.
Under Indonesian contracts,
ΓΌ  Delivery schedule (that is arrival of rice at the discharge port) is very sacrosanct;
ΓΌ  Any late arrival of the ship at the destined port may be rejected outright for acceptance and then the entire cargo may have to be offloaded at another country or re-consigned to Indian ports even if the establishment of letter of credit is delayed by the buyer in favour of the seller
ΓΌ  Quality is checked by BULOG inspectors at the load port and then again cargo condition is reviewed at discharge ports before releasing final 10% payment, notwithstanding furnishing of 10% performance bank guarantee by the seller. In short 20% payment is subject to deductions at buyer’s choice for lack of compliance to any of the contractual terms.

ΓΌ  BULOG being a governmental agency thus has no discretion in relaxing agreed terms, unless force-majeure is justified and accepted.
BULOG standard terms of contract must be minutely studied for implications before proceeding with any export agreement.
The above narration is vital for the proposed new dialogue for export of rice ex-FCI stocks via PSUs to BULOG. FCI carries 25% broken non-basmati white rice, while preference of Indonesian is for 10%-15% rice, unless the government directs it to upgrade-- which will inflate the price from current economic cost of $486/mt or Rs 32670 /mt ex warehouse. Upgrading one million tons of grain through domestic rice millers is a humongous exercise and scheduling or synchronizing it with an export contract is an appalling job.
With upgradation and re-bagging, the cost of FCI rice will escalate beyond $500/mt, plus port handling cost  and shipping freight, while Indian private trade will be able to supply at $ 368 fob/mt Kakinada—east coast India-- ( around Rs 25000/mt) and freight of $25/mt---thus at about  $393/mt. Likewise Thai and Vietnam fob values (around $360/mt fob) will compete with Indian private quotes along with added advantage of lower freight rates by about $10/mt. Pakistan is also quoting 15% broken rice at $365/mt fob.
 Commercially it does not make a sense for BULOG to deal with FCI stocks at uncompetitive prices.  There is no Indian competent authority which can subsidise rice exports from government holdings when privates can exports without any subvention. Indian annual exports of non-Basmati rice are 7-8 million tons in the recent past and combined with Basmati rice shipments of 3.5 to 4 million tons, this nation’s private trade (totalling 11-11.5 mill tons) is one of the largest in the world.  (World’s rice trade is apprx. 42 million tons)
Domestic procurement is the forte of FCI, while it has never been exposed to rice exports directly. All exports of FCI in 2000-05 were through private trade or through PSUs who also retained privates as back to back parties. In this instance though MMTC /STC may be directly dealing with BULOG as contractual party –they too will depend upon efficiency or inefficiency of FCI. All trading partners in the string –FCI/PSU/BULOG are official agencies and thus carry the least options of flexibility when any complications crop up in the course of implementation/shipment.
In 2010 and 2011 too, Government of Bangladesh (GOB) approached GOI for FCI rice of about 0.5 million tons, to be supplied through a PSU. FCI response was that buyer may arrange to lift grain from their stocks on “as is where is basis” at economic cost and let other parties— Indian PSUs and GOB take care of the rest. “As is where is basis” means that quality and specifications are not guaranteed by FCI.  Despite intervention from the highest level of the Government and multiple visits of officials of GOB to India, the talks failed to break the deadlock. No paper contract could be signed. 
Considering that FCI does not have rice of the specs that BULOG desires and its price (based on economic costs) will be much higher than other competing origins like Thailand, Vietnam, Pakistan and Indian private trade too--- why would any party, let alone BULOG shell out more than $100/mt higher because of Indian local taxes, storage cost and other incidentals. Furthermore, BULOG being a very reputed procurement agency is fully aware of dealing with nuances of Indian PSUs—where a selection of a vendor for upgrading, re-bagging, local transportation requires a tendering procedure.
Any buyer would require a seller of track record of performance as availability of food grain in a country is critical for socio-political reasons. No purchaser will dare to take a chance if the timely deliveries of acceptable quality are doubtful.  Will “G to G” rice deal to Indonesia will take off and succeed, is a big question?




 

Saturday, June 4, 2016

FIVE MILLION TONS WHEAT IMPORTS IMMINENT BY INDIA--- MARKET ESTIMATES VARY WITH GOVERNMENT PROJECTIONS

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FIVE MILLION TONS WHEAT IMPORTS IMMINENT--- MARKET ESTIMATES VARY WITH GOVERNMENT PROJECTIONS

Tejinder Narang  
Media reports mention that there is a “question mark” on the wheat production estimates for 2015-16. One cannot fault Government for lower output this year, which could be due to combined effect of two successive droughts and some policy related issues. Their impact cannot be apportioned any way. But the matter of concern is that official data appears to be at variance with market conditions.
Advance estimates of about 94 million tons of wheat still remain unchanged for 2015-16. Last year wheat output was about 86 million tons and FCI/ state Government agencies procured 28 mill tons while official purchases are limited to about 23 million tons this year –a gap of 5 million tons. Other probable factors that point to steep fall in production are— murmurs emanating from FCI that OMSS (open market sale scheme) to private players may not be serviced this year (last year 7 mill tons were disposed  due to excess availability); private import contracts of more than 0.5 mill ton are already concluded despite duty of 25%; lower sowing coverage area from 31 million hectare(mha) previous year and now about 29 mha; yield drop due to drought, could be less than average of 3 metric tons per ha;  market prices in Delhi/Uttar Pradesh in harvest season—when the supplies are considered ample--  are up from MSP of 1525/qtl to 1600+/qtl and down southern India around Rs 2000/qtl;   Thus these are definite indicators of low output. Market estimates it at 84 million tons-- about 10 million tons less than the official assessment.   This necessitates that overall wheat supply demand may be correctly configured so that timely action to supplement the shortfall by imports is taken.
 India’s annual “food” consumption (excluding seeds, feed and wastage) given by NCAER in 2012-13 was 82 million tons and “even if” we take 1% increase in usage, it is projected at 85 mill tons on non-compounded basis.  The accompanying chart details “Indian Wheat Budget” with comparison of deemed official estimates and rationale of market perception for grain available for human consumption. A back of the envelope calculation is that country may have to resort to import of about 4.8 or 5 mill tons if trade sentiments are accounted for.


Nation's  wheat budget
2015-16 




s. no.
item
Official estimate (mill tons)
Market estimate (mill tons)
1
Total production
94
84
2
Less --12.5% for seed/feed/ wastage
82.25
73.5
3
Central pool stocks on 1.04. 2016
14.5
14.5
4
Total available for food use (2+3)
96.75
88
5
*Consumption for "food use" minimum
82
85.3
6
National stocks on 1.04. 2017 (4-5)
14.75
2.7
7
Minimum buffer/ reserves on 1.04.2017
7.5
7.5
8
Import projection (7-6)
(-7.25) or Nil
4.8





*NCAER estimates 2012-13 were 82 mill tons. 1% increased taken p.a



The positive side of lower procurement is that excessive stockholdings create burden on national exchequer, lack of storage space leads to wastage and pilferage while the flip side is higher market prices, consequential inflationary pressure in the economy and adds to the compulsion of import failing which fundamental need of the citizens is at a great peril.
World stocks of wheat are abundant at 225 million tons; French/Russian wheat can be accessed below $200/mt fob; sea freight rates are much cheaper than those available in 2006-07 (last Indian official import). Import price ranged around $310-$330 (cost and freight) in 2006-07, and $/Rs rate was 41-42—that is at Rs 1350/qtl-- while MSP was Rs 750/qtl. In 2016-17, import at current rate of exchange, (without custom duty) may not exceed Rs 1400/qtl against MSP of Rs 1525/qtl.
Surely if the Government declares shortfall in this year production with intention of import for FCI—which is well factored in the international market—there could be some more spike in international prices. This is inevitable and cannot be avoided.
 If policymakers intend to cut down the role of the government in managing the commodity (the less the government, the better it is) and do not wish to offer 7 mill tons of wheat through OMSS this year, then it may facilitate “ease of doing business” for the private players, including India based MNCs—by removing or curtailing the import duty of 25%.
 More than a million tons of wheat has already been traded for the flour millers in 2015-16 and so far in 2016-17. Most of these imports have been serviced for the flour millers in Southern India from France and Australia. There are some obvious advantages of import by private players—it will be need based and in small lots as compared to large volume of single transaction by the state trading enterprises; government funding will be avoided; international prices will have to compete with domestic market and vice versa; excessive stocking /wastage/pilferage on government account will be prevented.
Large scale wheat imports are imperative this year. It is to be seen whether Government steps in or enables private trade to fill in supply/demand shortfall. Parallel imports both by Government and private parties may best be shunned to prevent hyper volatility in the international prices.